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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                           
  
PER CURIAM. 
 Petitioners Aldonda DeVetsco and Thomas Schmidt appeal 
from the district court's orders dismissing their petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of Keith Zettlemoyer and 
denying their request for a stay of Zettlemoyer's execution on 
the ground that they have no standing.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm the dismissal order of the district court 
and deny the petitioners' motion for a stay of execution filed in 
this court. 
 I. 
 On October 13, 1980, Keith Zettlemoyer was arrested and 
charged with murder for the shooting death of Charles DeVetsco.  
On April 24, 1981, after a jury trial in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Dauphin County, Zettlemoyer was convicted of first 
degree murder.  On that same date, after a brief sentencing 
hearing, the jury determined that the death penalty should be 
imposed. 
 After Zettlemoyer's post-verdict motions were denied, 
Zettlemoyer filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, which affirmed the conviction and sentence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937 (Pa. 1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983).  Zettlemoyer then filed a petition 
under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA"), 42 Pa. 
  
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541 et seq.1  The PCHA action was denied 
without a hearing, see Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 106 Dauphin 
County Reports 215 (1985), and that denial was affirmed on 
appeal.  Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 515 A.2d 620 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1986), allocatur denied, 518 A.2d 807 (Pa. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1007 (1987).  
 On July 17, 1987, Zettlemoyer filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
On May 31, 1988, the district court dismissed the petition.  The 
dismissal was affirmed by this court in a split opinion.  See 
Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 902 (1991).2 
 On February 28, 1995, the governor of Pennsylvania 
signed a death warrant scheduling Zettlemoyer's execution for the 
week of April 30, 1995.  The execution is currently set for May 
2, 1995. 
 On April 27, 1995, petitioners Aldonda DeVetsco, the 
mother of the individual murdered by Zettlemoyer, and Thomas 
Schmidt, who was Zettlemoyer's attorney in the PCHA proceedings 
                     
1
.  The PCHA was subsequently repealed and replaced with the Post 
Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541 
et seq. 
2
.  By happenstance, the same three judges are on this panel.  
They are not divided on the only issue before us, petitioners' 
standing to file these proceedings. 
  
and in Zettlemoyer's prior federal habeas action, filed a second 
petition for habeas corpus on Zettlemoyer's behalf in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.3  
The petition raises a variety of claims, including (1) that 
Zettlemoyer is mentally ill and incompetent and his execution 
would therefore violate the Eighth Amendment, (2) that 
Zettlemoyer's trial counsel was inadequate, (3) that newly 
discovered evidence suggests that the imposition of the death 
penalty in this case was unconstitutional under Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), and (4) that the method of 
execution (lethal injection) employed by the state of 
Pennsylvania constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.  In conjunction with the filing of the 
petition, petitioners filed an application to stay the execution. 
 On April 29, 1995, after a two-day evidentiary hearing, 
the district court concluded that DeVetsco and Schmidt lacked 
standing to pursue the petition.  It therefore dismissed the 
petition and denied the petitioners' application for the stay.  
The district court, however, granted the petitioners' application 
for a certificate of probable cause and this appeal followed.  In 
connection with the appeal, petitioners have filed with this 
                     
3
.  The petition also names Zettlemoyer as a petitioner.  
Zettlemoyer, however, did not participate in the preparation of 
the petition and he has not sanctioned the filing of the 
petition.   
  
court a "Motion for Stay of Execution and Request for a 
Meaningful Opportunity for Briefing and for Oral Argument." 
 II. 
 In considering the petitioners' request for a stay, and 
before proceeding to the merits of the petition, we must first 
address the threshold question of petitioners' standing to pursue 
this habeas petition and request for a stay.  Article III of the 
United States Constitution grants the federal courts jurisdiction 
over only "cases and controversies," and the standing doctrine 
"serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately 
resolved through the judicial process."  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (citing Valley Forge Christian College 
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)).  Where standing is lacking, the federal 
courts lack the power to grant habeas relief.  See Demosthenes v. 
Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 737 (1990).     
 In the petition, both DeVetsco and Schmidt argue that 
they are entitled to "next friend" standing to pursue the 
petition on behalf of Zettlemoyer.  In Whitmore, the Supreme 
Court clarified that a party seeking to establish "next friend" 
standing must, among other things, "provide an adequate 
explanation--such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or 
other disability--why the real party in interest cannot appear on 
his own behalf to prosecute the action."  Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 
  
163.4  The burden is on the "next friend" to establish this 
prerequisite.  Id. at 164.  Notably, the Whitmore Court also held 
that "next friend" standing is not available if "an evidentiary 
hearing shows that the defendant has given a knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed, and his access to 
court is otherwise unimpeded."  Id. at 165; see also Demosthenes 
v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734 (1990). 
 In this case, after a two-day evidentiary hearing, the 
district court concluded that DeVetsco and Schmidt failed to 
sustain their burden of establishing "inaccessibility, mental 
incompetence, other disability" on the part of Zettlemoyer.  
Transcript of April 29, 1995 at p. 280.  The district court 
further found that Zettlemoyer "has knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily opted to proceed with his execution with full 
understanding of the other options of unimpaired access to the 
courts."  Id. 
 The district court's conclusion on these issues are 
findings of fact that may not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 
892 F.2d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949 
(1990); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Mason by and through 
                     
4
.  The Whitmore Court also required that a party seeking "next 
friend" status "be truly dedicated to the best interests of the 
person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate" and suggested that 
the party "must have some significant relationship with the real 
party in interest."  Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64. 
  
Marson v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1993).  A 
finding may not be deemed clearly erroneous "[i]f the district 
court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 
record viewed in its entirety."  Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). 
 After a review of the record in this case, we conclude 
that the district court's conclusions are not clearly erroneous.  
We note that much of the evidence on which the petitioners rely 
concerns Zettlemoyer's mental state in 1984.  While there is  
more recent evidence presented by petitioners, the district court 
weighed that evidence with that presented by the respondents and 
gave the latter more weight in its findings and in reaching its 
conclusions.  Furthermore the district court had the opportunity 
to hear the testimony from Zettlemoyer himself, to observe 
Zettlemoyer, and to question him closely regarding his decision 
not to join in this habeas action. 
 We have carefully reviewed the transcript of 
Zettlemoyer which supports the district court's conclusion that 
he is competent.  For example, he explained why he wanted the 
execution to go forward.   
 THE WITNESS:  No, sir, I'm afraid that my execution is 
going to be stopped.  If it's stopped, sir, my 14 and-
a-half years of suffering will continue on in an 
unbroken chain for maybe another 14, 20, or 25 years.  
It's--the thought of all that is just deeply 
disturbing. 
 
  I'm afraid, sir, that Mr. Wiseman may somehow 
  
 convince you to issue a stay of execution and stop my 
execution.  I have a very deep fear of that, sir, and 
I'm hoping that as a direct result of you sitting 
there, talking to me, that you are an intelligent man, 
and can tell that I am not mentally incompetent. 
 
  I am not crazy, I'm not loony.  I understand  
 perfectly what's going on with the execution and 
everything, and it was my desire, which I expressed to 
my attorney, to come up here and try to untwist some of 
the terrible things that Mr. Wiseman has gotten up here 
and twisted.  He has taken things out of context.  He 
has twisted the truth.  He has used half-truths. 
 
Transcript of April 29, 1995 at 149.  
 
 A.  Those are one of the reasons, sir.  My other two 
reasons are that my imprisonment has been very, very harsh.  You 
must understand, sir, that I've only been in general population 
for 14 months out of 15 years imprisonment.  I have done the 
hardest time of any convict in prison. 
 
  I see my execution as an end of suffering to my 
imprisonment, a blessed, merciful release from all of these 
health symptoms that I'm constantly suffering with. 
 
  And ten and-a-half years ago I became a Christian. 
 And as a Christian, I have many questions and desires 
that I wish to know, and only God can answer those 
questions.  So I'm very anxious to get to Heaven, so to 
speak, so that I can finally learn the answers to all 
of these deep religious and philosophical questions 
that have come across my mind for all of these years, 
sir. 
 
Transcript of April 29, 1995 at 182.  
 
 There is adequate evidence to support the district 
court's findings and conclusions that petitioners failed to prove 
that Zettlemoyer was incompetent and that Zettlemoyer has 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to 
  
proceed.5  Schmidt and DeVetsco therefore are not entitled to 
"next friend" standing.  See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149.  In the 
absence of "next friend" standing for Schmidt or DeVetsco or the 
appointment of a guardian, we conclude that the district court 
correctly dismissed the petition, as no "adequate basis exists 
for the exercise of federal power" in this case.  See 
Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 737.6  
                     
5
.  Petitioners argue on appeal that they did not receive a "full 
and fair hearing" in the district court.  They complain that the 
district court gave them no notice that an evidentiary hearing 
would be held on Friday, April 28, 1995, that the district court 
made numerous comments evidencing its disdain for petitioners' 
counsel, that they had an inadequate opportunity to examine the 
background of the court-appointed psychiatrist, and that the 
district court improperly barred petitioners' counsel from 
conducting a full examination of Zettlemoyer.  After a careful 
review of the record, we find all of these contentions meritless.  
The petition in this case was filed a mere five days before the 
execution was scheduled, and the district court made every effort 
to ensure that the petitioners received a full and fair 
opportunity to present evidence in support of their case.  
Indeed, in light of the emergency nature of the petition, we 
commend the district court for its extensive and thorough 
approach to the issues raised by the petition.      
6
.  Because we affirm the district court's conclusion that it is 
powerless to address the issues raised in the petition due to 
petitioners' clear lack of standing, we need not address 
petitioners' suggestion that the district court erred by failing 
to await the outcome of petitioners' state court proceedings. Nor 
need we address petitioners' argument that the district court's 
grant of the certificate of probable cause to appeal requires 
this court to reach the merits of the petition under Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1985).  We note, however, that Barefoot 
requires only that we reach the merits of the appeal, not the 
merits of the issues raised in the underlying habeas petition.  
Id. at 888-89.  By affirming the district court's order 
dismissing the petition, we have reached the merits of this 
  
 In reaching our result we have considered petitioners' 
contention at oral argument, predicated on Perry v. Louisiana, 
498 U.S. 38 (1990), and State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992), 
that the district court's finding that Zettlemoyer was competent 
to waive further appeals should be reversed because Zettlemoyer 
was taking an anti-depressant/anti-psychotic drug when he 
testified before the district court and when he wrote a letter on 
March 28, 1995, indicating that he wanted no further appeals. 
 In Perry v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court vacated a 
decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court denying review of a trial 
court's decision "order[ing] the state to administer 
antypsychotic drugs to [a] prisoner" in order to make him able 
"to understand the link between his crime and punishment."  State 
v. Perry, 610 So.2d at 747.  The Supreme Court remanded the case 
for consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 
(1990). 
 Those cases are inapposite.  Harper only held that an 
inmate has a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Harper, 494 U.S. at 
221 (emphasis added).  Of course, as the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana held upon Perry's remand, the involuntary 
(..continued) 
appeal, and have therefore satisfied our obligation under 
Barefoot.  
  
administration of antypsychotic medications for no legitimate 
penological purpose other than making the defendant competent for 
execution is a clear violation of the defendant's constitutional 
rights.  State v. Perry, 610 So.2d at 754 (trial court's order 
"cannot be justified under Harper because forcible administration 
of drugs to implement execution is not medically appropriate.") 
 In this case, however, the record is clear that 
Zettlemoyer voluntarily took the medication as part of a course 
of treatment for his medical problems.  He testified before the 
district court that "I have a number of health problems, and the 
psychiatrist and the psychologist at the SCI Pittsburgh 
Institution have recommended a variety of medications for me to 
take.  And it benefits me tremendously so I always take it."  
Transcript of April 29, 1995 at 140.  Thus, Zettlemoyer's 
situation is markedly different from Harper's and Perry's, and 
the policies underlying those cases do not cast doubt on the 
district court's finding.  To order the trial court to force 
Zettlemoyer to stop taking medications that were prescribed for 
him in the course of legitimate medical treatment, and that he 
desires to take -- simply to see what he would say if he went 
untreated -- would be a bizarre way to vindicate the Due Process 
Clause.  We decline to extend Harper and Perry in that manner. 
 III. 
 Conclusion 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the district court dismissing the petition for habeas corpus for 
lack of standing and deny petitioners' motion for a stay of 
execution. 
  
 
 
 
